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Abstract
The current definition of a conditional probability distribution en-
ables one to update probabilities only on the basis of stochastic infor-
mation. This paper provides a definition for conditional probability
distributions with non–stochastic information. The definition is de-
rived as a solution of a decision theoretic problem, where the informa-
tion is connected to the outcome of interest via a loss function. We
shall show that the Kullback–Leibler divergence plays a central role.
Some illustrations are presented.
Keywords: Conditional probability distribution, conditional probability
density, loss function, Kullback–Leibler divergence, g-divergence.
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1 Introduction
The theory of conditional probability distributions is a well-established math-
ematical theory that provides a procedure to update probabilities taking
into account new information. To motivate the new work in this paper, we
mention that such a procedure is available only if the information which is
used to update the probability concerns stochastic events; that is, events to
which a probability is assigned. In other words, such information needs to
be already included into the probability model.
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1.1 Notation
Before proceeding, we introduce the notation. Let Y be a random variable
on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), which will be the outcome of interest,
and valued into a measurable space (Y, Y ) with probability distribution P .
Hence, P represents initial belief about the outcome concerning Y . By I we
shall denote the information obtained about Y . If I is stochastic, then we
shall represent it by a random variable X from (Ω,F ,P) into (X, X ) with
probability distribution Q and I will be assumed to be an outcome of X.
We will denote by PI the updated P given information I.
We will let D denote the Kullback-Leibler divergence (relative entropy),
i.e.
D(Q1, Q2) =
∫
log
(
dQ1
dQ2
)
dQ1,
for any couple (Q1, Q2) of probability measures such that Q1 ≪ Q2. More
generally we define the g-divergence:
Dg(Q1, Q2) =
∫
g
(
dQ1
dQ2
)
dQ2,
for any couple (Q1, Q2) of probability measures such that Q1 ≪ Q2, where
g is a convex function from (0,∞) into R such that g(1) = 0. This class of
probability discrepancies has been introduced and studied independently by
Ali & Silvey (1966) and Csisza´r (1967). The Kullback–Leibler divergence is
a particular case, which can be obtained taking g(x) = x log(x).
1.2 Mathematical framework
When the standard definition of conditional probability does not apply, for
reasons we discuss later, we present an alternative definition based on a
mathematical decision theoretic framework. When information received is
non–stochastic, but relevant to an outcome of interest, we cannot use a
probability distribution and so we need an alternative way to connect the
information I with outcome of interest Y . We do so using loss functions.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a definition of a conditional
distribution of Y on the basis of I, which we shall denote by PI . We take
the pair (I, P ) to PI as the solution to a decision problem based on the
minimization of a cumulative loss function. This loss function will be defined
on the class of probability measures on Y that are absolutely continuous
with respect to P , call this P. Indeed, the conditional probability should
be zero on every event whose unconditional probability is zero. Here, λ ∈ P
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will denote the action and the best choice, i.e. minimizing the loss function,
will be defined as the conditional probability distribution for Y given I. In
order to properly assess the loss function, it will be expressed as the sum
(cumulative loss) of two terms, i.e.
L(λ) = HI(λ) + l(λ, P ), (1)
where l(λ, P ) is a discrepancy between the probability measure λ and P and
HI(λ) is the component of the loss that takes into account the information
relating to I. In fact, we will show that l(λ, P ) should be the Kullback–
Leibler divergence for coherence purposes. So, PI will be defined as that λ
which minimizes L(λ).
1.3 Relation to the literature
In the literature, definitions of conditional probability, such as the Jeffrey’s
Rule of conditioning, are given where new information is not put in terms of
the occurrence of an event included in the model. These definitions rely on
the assumption that the information can be given in the form of a constraint
(or a combination of constraints) on the probability. Constraints considered
are of the type ∫
Y
g(y)λ(dy) > 0, (2)
where g is a measurable real function on Y and the strict inequality is
sometimes replaced by a not strict one. The idea is to minimize D(λ, P )
subject to the constraint (2), which represents information I. This problem
can be solved, i.e. PI can be obtained, by minimizing D(λ, P ) subject to
the constraint using Lagrange multipliers.
Such a procedure of condizionalization is a specific case in our approach.
In fact, it is equivalent to minimize the loss function (1) taking l equal to
the Kullback–Leibler divergence and
HI(λ) =
{
0 if
∫
Y
g(y)λ(dy) > 0,
+∞ if
∫
Y
g(y)λ(dy) ≤ 0.
For more details about conditionalization based upon constraints on the
conditional distribution, see Van Fraassen (1992), Skyrms (1985), Domotor
(1985), Diaconis & Zabell (1982) and Shore & Johnson (1980). Our ap-
proach is different as we encompass potentially arbitrary information about
Y , so as long as it is possible to construct a loss function hI(y) for each Y
given I.
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1.4 Motivation
The random variable Y represents an unknown quantity to which a proba-
bility distribution has been assigned and needs to be updated on the basis
of new information I. If I coincides with an outcome of another random
variable X, then it is possible to update the unconditional distribution of
Y to the probability distribution of Y given X. However, to do this, it is
required to know all the possible alternatives of I, that is, all the outcomes
of X. Moreover, it is required to assess the joint distribution of X and Y or
the conditional distribution of X given Y . This is quite easy if, for instance,
I is known to be an outcome of some well-defined random experiment. In
many situations, one has seen the outcome X and in order to establish an
update of the distribution of Y , one needs to retrospectively ponder and
imagine a joint probability model.
This difficulty arises in different puzzles such as, for instance, Freund’s
puzzle of the two aces, introduced by Freund (1965). For other puzzles about
conditional probabilities, see, for instance, Gardner (1959).
These puzzles have been widely used to discuss the concept of condi-
tional probability. Hutchison (1999, 2008) emphasizes that the updating
process needs to take into account the circumstances under which the truth
of I was conveyed. Also, Bar-Hillel & Falk (1982) claim that to know how
the knowledge was obtained is “a crucial ingredient to select the appropriate
model”. These scholars present different views about the concept of condi-
tionalization, but all agree on the fact that there would not be a problem
if it was known how the information I became available, and therefore one
could build a model including I.
The concept of conditional probability distributions is certainly appro-
priate as a procedure to update probabilities on the basis of any new in-
formation that was already included in the probability model. But it can
be difficult to construct a model that considers all possible relevant infor-
mation that in the future could become available. Therefore, the problem
arises when one obtains some new and possibly unexpected information and
wants to use it to update a probability distribution. Indeed, it does not seem
appropriate to assess the probability of something which has been already
observed. Our basic assumption is that the information I can be connected
to the outcome of interest via a loss function HI defined on the set of all
possible outcomes of Y . The conditional distribution of Y given I will be
defined as the one that minimizes a cumulative loss in the form given by (1).
In this way, it is possible to update the distribution of Y , even if I is some
new unexpected information, which was not included in the probabilistic
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framework. It will be shown that if instead I is the outcome of a random
variable X and there is a joint density f for (X,Y ), then one can recover
as particular case the conditional distribution of Y given X. To do this, l
is taken to be the Kullback–Leibler divergence. It will be proved that in
general it is necessary for the updating procedure to be coherent that l is
the Kullback–Leibler divergence.
1.5 Description of the paper
Section 2 contains the main results. In Section 3, some examples will be
considered. One such is as follows: assume that Y is a scalar quantity and
one learns that Y is close to zero. An answer will be given to this question:
how could one update the distribution of Y after learning such information?
Section 4 contains a discussion.
2 Defining conditional probability distributions with
non–stochastic information
This section reports the current definition of conditional probability distri-
bution and presents and motivates our definition for conditional probability
distribution with non–stochastic information.
2.1 The current definition
In probability theory, a conditional distribution of Y given X is a map p
from Y × X into R such that:
• for each x in X, p(·, x) is a probability measure on Y ,
• for each B in Y , p(B,X(ω)) is a version of the conditional probability
P(Y ∈ B | X(ω)), i.e. for each A in X and each B in Y ,
P{X ∈ A, Y ∈ B} =
∫
A
p(B,x) dQ(x), (3)
where Q denotes the probability distribution of X.
The conditional distribution is known to be essentially unique, i.e. unique
only up to a.s. equality. This is a consequence of X being stochastic. In
fact, as Feller (1971, page 160) points out, if, for instance, the distribution
of X is concentrated on a subset X0 of X, no natural definition of p(B,x)
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is possible for x outside X0. Nevertheless, in individual cases, there usually
exists a natural choice dictated by regularity requirements.
Moreover, it is well known that conditional distributions do not always
exist unless some conditions are satisfied by the spaces (X,X ) and (Y,Y ).
For more information about conditional probability distributions, see, for
instance, Feller (1971) or Billingsley (1995).
This paper will consider the case in which there are two σ-finite measures
µ and ν on F such that the probability distribution of (X, Y ) is absolutely
continuous with respect to µ× ν. Denote its density by f . This is a general
framework which includes most applications and enables to find easily an
expression for the conditional distributions. Generally, X and Y are subsets
of Rk, for some k, and µ and ν are the corresponding Lebesgue measure.
If f is the density of the probability distribution of (X, Y ) with respect
to µ× ν, then one can take
p(B,x) =
∫
B
f(x, y) ν(dy)∫
Y
f(x, y) ν(dy)
, (4)
for every B in Y and every x in X such that
0 < fX(x) :=
∫
Y
f(x, y) ν(dy) < ∞. (5)
Note that p(·, x) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. ν and its density is
fY |X(y|x) := f(x, y)/fX(x), (6)
for every x in X satisfying (5). The density (6), which is called the con-
ditional density of Y given X, is what is used in most application to find
an expression for the conditional distribution. Therefore, (4) deserves to be
considered as the “practical definition” of conditional probability distribu-
tion. Indeed, it is the natural version of the conditional distribution of Y
given X whenever a joint density f exists for X and Y .
2.2 The loss function
Given it is not always possible to relate new information I to Y through
probability models, instead, we will rely on the use of loss functions to
“connect” the information I to Y . We will deal with the theory first, and
then present some examples.
Before proceeding, let us recall that q(B, ·) satisfying (3) can be seen as
the solution of a minimization problem whenever Y is in L2(Ω,F , P ), by
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resorting to the theory of Hilbert spaces (see, for instance, Jacod & Protter
2003). Clearly, this approach relies on the joint distribution of X and Y
and therefore is not available when X is replaced by some non–stochastic
information I.
So, our aim is to define a conditional probability distribution as a solution
of a decision problem with a fully motivated loss function; connecting the
action, i.e. the conditional distribution, with current and given pieces of
information: namely the probability distribution P of Y and I, respectively.
The form of the loss function we consider is (1). In particular, HI(λ)
will be taken in the integral form i.e. the average or expected loss
HI(λ) =
∫
Y
hI(y) λ(dy),
where hI(·, P ) is a loss function defined on Y. It is more reasonable to assess
the loss relating to Y and therefore it is reasonable to be able to construct
hI(y). Examples will be considered later. If λ then represents beliefs about
Y , it is appropriate to consider the expected loss here. Therefore, to define
conditional distributions, a cumulative loss will be used of the following
form: ∫
Y
hI(y) λ(dy) + l(λ, P ). (7)
This general cumulative loss then represents or assesses the loss to the deci-
sion maker if they select probability measure λ in the presence of information
I and P .
2.3 Stochastic information
Let us see how this works when indeed I is equivalent to a random variable
X and there is a joint density f for (X,Y ). In this setting, the conditional
distribution (4) arises as the solution of a decision theoretic problem. To see
this, for every x in X satisfying (5), define the following loss function L¯x:
L¯x(λ) := −
∫
S
log(f(x, y)/fY (y)) λ(dy) + D(λ, P ), (8)
where
fY (y) :=
∫
X
f(x, y) µ(dx),
S is the set of all y in S such that 0 < fY (y) < ∞, P is the probability
distribution of Y , λ is a probability measure on Y absolutely continuous
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w.r.t. P , and D The loss (8) is of the form (7) with
l(λ, P ) = D(λ, P ),
and
hI(y) = h(y, x) : = −IS(y) log(f(x, y)/fY (y))
= −IS(y) log fX|Y (x|y),
(9)
where IS(y) is equal to 1 or 0 depending on whether y belongs to S or not.
For every x in X satisfying (5), the conditional distribution p(·, x) given
by (4) minimizes the loss L¯x, since
L¯x(λ) = D(λ, p(·, x)) − log
(∫
Y
f(x, y) ν(dy)
)
.
In the loss (8), the first addendum depends on the joint density function
of X and Y and therefore, to be able to define such loss, X needs to be
stochastic. In other words, a probability distribution has to be assigned to
X.
The loss (9) is known as the self–information loss function and the most
commonly used when x has come from a specified family of densities. So, HI
turns out to be the the expected or average loss, using the self–information
loss function − log fX|Y (x|y).
2.4 Non–stochastic information
If the random variable X is replaced by some non–stochastic information I,
then the self–information loss (9) cannot be defined, but one can still resort
to a loss function of the form (7), assessing hI(y) in a different way. As usual,
hI(y) evaluates the additional loss in outcome y due to the acquirement of
I. Some examples for this will be considered later.
In the loss (8), the Kullback–Leibler divergence from the marginal of Y
can also be replaced by a more general discrepancy, such as the g-divergence.
This leads us to consider a more general loss function than (8) as follows:∫
Y
hI(y) λ(dy) + Dg(λ, P ), (10)
where hI is assessed after learning I, information which does not need to be
stochastic. As the loss (8), the loss (10) is defined on the class of probability
measures on Y that are absolutely continuous with respect to P , which is
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reasonable. Assume there is a unique probability measure that minimizes
(10) in the class of probability measures on Y absolutely continuous with
respect to P . Then, it will be called the conditional distribution of Y given
the information I (according to the discrepancy Dg and the loss hI) and it
will be denoted by PI .
At this stage, assume that another piece J of information is available in
addition to I and that I and J are not overlapping pieces of information.
This happens, for instance, in the stochastic case when I and J are outcomes
of two independent random variables. We shall write IJ (or equivalently JI)
to denote the information obtained combining I with J . Being I and J not
overlapping, we choose hI , hJ and hIJ satisfying the following additivity
property:
hIJ(y) = hI(y) + hJ(y). (11)
Clearly, updating the distribution P on the basis of I and J and updating
the conditional distribution PI on the basis of J only, should yield the same
probability distribution for Y . In the first case, the updated probability
distribution is obtained by minimizing the loss:∫
Y
hIJ(y) λ(dy) + Dg(λ, P ). (12)
In the second one, the loss to minimize is:∫
Y
hJ(y) λ(dy) + Dg(λ, PI). (13)
The two losses (12) and (13) should yield the same updated probability
distribution for Y .
For this coherence condition to be in force, it is necessary that the dis-
crepancy Dg is the Kullback-Leibler divergence. To be more precise, the
following theorem can be stated:
Theorem. Let P¯ := PI , and assume that (11) holds and
PIJ = P¯J , (14)
for every probability measure P on Y and for every choice of the loss func-
tions hI and hJ such that PI , PIJ and P¯J are all properly defined.
Then Dg is the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Proof. This result is proven from a different starting point in Bissiri & Walker
(2010, Theorem 2.5). Here, a shorter proof is given by assuming the differ-
entiability of g.
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Assume that Y contains at least two distinct points, say y0 and y1.
Otherwise, P is degenerate and the thesis is trivially satisfied.
To prove this theorem, it is sufficient to consider a very specific choice
for P , taking P = p0δy0 + (1 − p0)δy1 , where 0 < p0 < 1. Any probability
measure λ ≪ P has to be equal to pδy0 + (1 − p)δy1 , for some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Therefore, in this specific situation, the loss (10) becomes:
l(p, p0, hI) := p hI(y0) + (1− p)hI(y1)
+ p0 g
(
p
p0
)
+ (1− p0) g
(
1− p
1− p0
)
.
Denote by p1 the probability PI({y0}), i.e. the minimum point of l(p, p0, hI)
as a function of p, and by p2 the probability PIJ({y0}). By hypotheses, p2 is
the unique minimum point of both loss functions l(p, p1, hJ ) and l(p, p0, hIJ ).
Again by hypothesis, we shall consider only those functions hI and hJ such
that each one of the functions l(p, p0, hI), l(p, p1, hJ ), and l(p, p0, hIJ), as a
function of p, has a unique minimum point, which is p1 for the first one and p2
for the second and third one. The values p1 and p2 have to be strictly bigger
than zero and strictly smaller than one: this was proved by Bissiri & Walker
(2010, Lemma 2). Hence, p1 has to be a stationary point of l(p, p0, hI) and
p2 of both the functions l(p, p1, hJ ) and l(p, p0, hIJ). Therefore,
g′
(
p1
p0
)
− g′
(
1− p1
1− p0
)
= hI(y1) − hI(y0), (15)
g′
(
p2
p0
)
− g′
(
1− p2
1− p0
)
= hIJ(y1) − hIJ(y0), (16)
g′
(
p2
p1
)
− g′
(
1− p2
1− p1
)
= hJ(y1) − hJ (y0). (17)
Recall that hIJ = hJ + hI by (11). Therefore, summing up term by term
(15) and (17), and considering (16), one obtains:
g′
(
p2
p0
)
− g′
(
1− p2
1− p0
)
= g′
(
p1
p0
)
− g′
(
1− p1
1− p0
)
+ g′
(
p2
p1
)
− g′
(
1− p2
1− p1
)
.
(18)
Recall that by hypothesis (15)–(17) need to hold for every two func-
tions hI and hJ arbitrarily chosen with the only requirement that p1 and p2
uniquely exist. Hence, (18) needs to hold for every (p0, p1, p2) in (0, 1)
3. By
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substituting t = p0, x = p1/p0 and y = p2/p1, (18) becomes
g′ (xy) − g′
(
1− txy
1− t
)
= g′(x) − g′
(
1− tx
1− t
)
+ g′ (y) − g′
(
1− txy
1− tx
)
,
(19)
which holds for every 0 < t < 1, and every x, y > 0 such that x < 1/t and
y < 1/(xt). Being g convex and differentiable, its derivative g′ is continuous.
Therefore, letting t go to zero, (19) implies that
g′ (xy) = g′(x) + g′ (y) − g′(1) (20)
holds true for every x, y > 0. Define the function ϕ(·) = g′(·) − g′(1). This
function is continuous, being g′ such, and by (20), ϕ(xy) = ϕ(x) + ϕ(y)
holds for every x, y > 0. Hence, ϕ(·) is k ln(·) for some k, and therefore
g′(x) = k ln(x) + g′(1), (21)
where k = (g′(2) − g′(1))/ ln(2). Being g convex, g′ is not decreasing and
therefore k ≥ 0. If k = 0, then g′ is constant, which is impossible, otherwise,
for any hI , p1 satisfying (15) either would not exist or would not be unique.
Therefore, k must be positive. Being g(1) = 0 by assumption, (21) implies
that g(x) = k x ln(x) + (g′(1)− k)(x− 1). Hence,
Dg(Q1, Q2) = k
∫
ln
(
dQ1
dQ2
)
dQ1
holds true for some k > 0 and for every couple of measures (Q1, Q2) such
that Q1 ≪ Q2.
In virtue of this theorem, the conditional distribution of Y given the
information I is coherent only if it minimizes the loss
L¯(λ) :=
∫
Y
hI(y) λ(dy) + k
∫
ln
(
dλ
dP
)
dλ, (22)
where k is some positive constant. To define the loss (22), one needs to
assess hI and k. Notice that a probability distribution that minimizes L¯(λ)
, or equivalently L¯(λ)/k, is uniquely identified by hI/k. In other words,
assessing hI = h0 and k = k0 is equivalent to assess hI = h0/k0 and k = 1.
For this reason, from now on, it will be convenient to fix k = 1.
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In what follows, only coherent conditional distributions will be consid-
ered. Therefore, Dg will always be assessed to be the Kullback–Leibler di-
vergence. Whenever a probability measure that minimizes (22) (with k = 1)
exists and is unique, it will be called the conditional probability distribution
of Y given I and will be denoted by PI .
If ∫
Y
e−hI(y) P (dy) <∞, (23)
then PI is properly defined and is equal to
PI(A) =
∫
A
e−hI(y)P (dy)∫
Y
e−hI(u) P (du)
, (24)
for every measurable subset A of Y. In fact,
L¯(λ) = D(λ, PI)− ln
(∫
Y
e−hI(y) P (dy)
)
holds true for every probability measure λ on Y such that λ≪ P .
By (24), it is clear that the choice of the Kullback–Leibler divergence for
Dg and of a loss hI satisfying (23) is sufficient for the coherence condition
(14). Moreover, notice that PI is defined to be a unique probability measure,
not just essentially unique.
3 Illustrations
The loss function hI is chosen by the decision-maker on the basis of the
available information. Such information sometimes happens to be stochastic,
i.e to belong to a set of outcomes to which a probability is assigned. If this is
the case, one should update the probability distribution of Y by means of the
usual conditional distribution. Whenever there is a joint density f forX and
Y , this is tantamount to use the self–information loss function hI(y, x) =
− ln fX|Y (x|y). If the available information is not stochastic, then one can
resort to the approach described in the present paper, properly assessing
the loss function hI . To see a practical and simple example, consider the
situation mentioned in the Introduction:
Example 1. Y is a scalar quantity and the information I is that Y is close
to zero. In this case, it is natural to assess:
hI(y) = w y
2,
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where w is some positive constant, and the conditional distribution of Y
given I is
PI(A) =
∫
A
e−w y
2
P (dy)∫
Y
e−w y2 P (dy)
.
Example 2. While for the second example everyone would know how to deal
with, there is currently no formal mathematical mechanism for pursuing a
conditional update. So suppose it becomes known that Y belongs to B, for
some set B. Not because of some preliminary random experiment but rather
due to it becoming aware to the decision maker that actually B is the set of
possible values that Y can take. So the information is non–stochastic. The
most natural choice is
hI(y) =


0 y ∈ B
+∞ y /∈ B
from which it is easy to deduce that the λminimising
∫
hI(y)λ(dy)+D(λ, P )
is given by
PI(A) =
∫
A∩B
P (dy)/P (B).
This example is relevant to a number of so-called paradoxes whereby it
becomes apparent to the decision maker that the outcome space is smaller
than the support of P (e.g. Freund’s paradox of the two aces). How this
is learnt is crucial. This has been pointed out by Hutchison (1999, 2008).
If the information that Y belongs to B is based on some preliminary ran-
dom experiment, for which a probability model is given, then obviously the
unconditional distribution of Y can be updated resorting to the current
definition of conditional probability. If not, there is not currently a rigor-
ous justification for the usage of the conditional probability. The present
paper provides a formal and broad enough framework to cover this case.
Many philosophers of science, that are mentioned in the Introduction, have
discovered paradoxes based on such scenarios.
Example 3. To conclude, let us consider a simple and very concrete example.
Consider a horse race, in which six horses participate. In order to decide
how to bet, one assesses the probability for each horse to win. Denote by
pj the probability that the horse number j wins, for j ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. In this
example, Y is the number corresponding to the horse that will win.
Before the race begins, it starts raining. Since conditions have changed,
the probabilities need to be updated. It is problematic to pursue this aim
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by resorting to the current definition of conditional probability. In fact, this
requires to know the probability that it rains and that the horse number
j wins. As an alternative, one could calculate the conditional probabilities
of victory for each horse by applying Bayes’ theorem, which requires the
probability that it rains given the victory of horse j. But it is raining and
the race is not yet run!
It is therefore appropriate to resort to the definition of a conditional
probability distribution given in this paper. To this aim, one can assess a
score to evaluate the disadvantage due to the rain for each horse. Denote
by hj the score referred to the horse number j. If the ability of the horse j
is unaffected by the rain, then hj = 0. If not, hj is positive. A higher score
will be given to those horses whose ability to run is more affected. In this
way, one can set
hI(y) =
∑6
j=1 hjI{j}(y),
where I is the information that it’s raining and I0 is the initial information
about the horses and the weather. The updated probability that the j-th
horse wins turns out to be
PI({j}) =
e−hjpj∑6
i=1 e
−hipi
,
for j = 1, . . . , 6.
4 Discussion
We have established a framework in which we can update probabilities in
the light of general, i.e. non–stochastic, information. Given that we cannot
connect the information and the outcome of interest via a probability model,
we do so through a loss function. Minimizing a cumulative loss function
involving the information on one side and the probability distribution on the
other, yields the updated probability distribution. When the information is
stochastic, we employ the self information loss function; the solution then
reverts to the standard definition of conditional probability.
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